Since nobody can guarantee that the computation of discrete logarithms in elliptic curves or IF p remains intractible for the future it is important to study cryptosystems based on alternative groups. A promising candidate, which was proposed by Buchmann and Williams 8], is the class group C l( ) of an imaginary quadratic order O .
Introduction
A general and possible inherent problem of all currently known public key cryptosystems is that their intractability is based on certain unproven assumptions. Thus nobody can guarantee that popular cryptosystems based on factoring integers or computing discrete logarithms in some group remain secure for the future. Therefore it is important to study alternative primitives and di erent groups to have a backup if one assumption such as the intractability of factoring or computation of discrete logarithms in one group turns out to be false. Beside the multiplicative group of nite elds and the group of points on (hyper-) elliptic curves over nite elds, a very promising candidate for a group in which the discrete logarithm is hard is the class group Cl( ) of imaginary quadratic orders, like proposed by Buchmann and Williams 8] in 1988. For example the discrete logarithm problem in Cl( ) has the interesting property that it is at least as hard as factoring the discriminant . Another reason which makes studying imaginary quadratic orders O very important today is that these rings are isomorphic to the endomorphism rings of non-supersingular elliptic curves over nite elds. Thus a good understanding of these rings can shed some light on the real di culty of the discrete logarithm problem in elliptic curves. While one year later Hafner and McCurley discovered a subexponential algorithm 16] to compute discrete logarithms in Cl( ), this algorithm only has running time L 1 2 ; 1] and is far less e cient than the number eld sieve to compute discrete logarithms in IF p or factoring integers with L n 1 3 ; ( 64 9 ) 1=3 ]. The precise de nition of L n e; c] will be given in Section 3. Thus one may choose the relevant parameters smaller to obtain the same level of security. It is an open question whether there is an L 1 3 ; c] algorithm to compute discrete logarithms in arbitrary imaginary quadratic class groups Cl( ). Note that as mentioned above this would imply another asymptotically fast algorithm for factoring integers, because factoring the discriminant is reduced to the computation of discrete logarithms in Cl( ). Furthermore these cryptosystems based on imaginary quadratic class groups are not only interesting from a theoretical point of view. Recently there were proposed cryptosystems with very practical properties. We will only name a few cryptosystems based on imaginary quadratic orders here and refer to Section 2 or 21] for a more comprehensive survey . In 26] there was proposed a public key cryptosystem with quadratic decryption time. To our knowledge this is the only known cryptosystem having this property. First implementations show that the decryption is as e cient as RSA-encryption with e = 2 16 + 1. While this cryptosystem is based on factoring, it is also possible to set up interesting DL-based cryptosystems using non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. If one uses the recently developed exponentiation technique for totally non-maximal orders 20] it is possible to implement e cient DSA-analogues. The running time is roughly comparable to DSA in IF p and there is certainly much space for further improvements. The major property of these totally non-maximal orders is that the class number of the maximial order h( 1 ) = 1 and thus the class number of the non-maximal order h( p ) = p ? ( 1 p ), where the conductor p is prime and ( 1 p ) is the Kronecker-Symbol, is known immediately. Note that these totally non-maximal quadratic orders are therefore analogous to supersingular elliptic curves, where one also knows the group order in advance. In this work we will show that they do not only share this property with supersingular elliptic curves. We will show that the discrete logarithm problem in totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders can be reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in IF p (if
The reduction is very e cient and can be performed in (expected) O(log 3 p) bit operations. Thus the situation for cryptosystems based on imaginary quadratic orders is somewhat analogous to the situation for cryptosystems based on elliptic curves. This may be summarized as follows:
While there is no algorithm with L 1 3 ; c] for the computation of discrete logarithms in imaginary quadratic class groups in general, there are problem classes for which such an algorithm is known. This is no general problem however, because it is easy to avoid these weak classes in practice.
It is clear that an analogous statement for elliptic curves would be somewhat sharper and consider algorithms with subexponential running time L p e; c], e < 1. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we will give a brief survey of cryptosystems based on imaginary quadratic orders, because many results appeared very recently and are sometimes not yet published. Section 3 gives the necessary background and notations of imaginary quadratic orders. In Section 4 we will provide the main result of this paper which consists of the reduction of the discrete logarithm problem in totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders to the discrete logarithm problem in nite elds. Finally, in Section 5, we will conclude this work by discussing the cryptographical implications of our result.
A brief survey of cryptosystems based on imaginary quadratic orders
We will only highlight the most important works in this direction and refer to 21] for a more comprehensive treatment.
As mentioned above it is a general problem that the security of popular cryptosystems is based on unproven assumptions. Nobody can guarantee that DL-type cryptosystems based on nite elds or elliptic curves over nite elds will stay secure forever. Thus it is important to study alternative groups which can be used if an e cient algorithm for the computation of discrete logarithms in one particular type of group is discovered.
The early days -maximal orders
With this motivation Buchmann and Williams 8] proposed to use imaginary quadratic class groups Cl( ) for the construction of cryptosystems. A nice property of this approach is that breaking this scheme is at least as di cult as factoring the fundamental discriminant of the maximal order. Furthermore it should be mentioned that imaginary quadratic orders are closely related to non-supersingular elliptic curves over nite elds. They happen to be isomorphic to their endomorphism ring. Thus a sound understanding of imaginary quadratic orders may lead to a better understanding of the real security of elliptic curve cryptosystems. In 1988, when they proposed these groups for cryptographic purposes, the best algorithms to compute the class number h( ) and discrete logarithms in Cl( ) were exponential time algorithms with L 1; 1 5 ] 23, 30] assuming the truth of the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH) or L 1; 1 4 ] without this assumption. In 6] there was reported the rst implementation and a complexity analysis of this key agreement scheme. For example it was shown that the complexity of an exponentiation in Cl( ) needs O(log 4 j j) bit opertions, which is fairly ine cient compared to the original scheme 13] which is of cubic complexity. Another problem of cryptosystems based on class group Cl( ) of the maximal order, was that the computation of the class number h( ) is almost as di cult as the computation of discrete logarithms. Thus it seemed impossible to set up signature schemes analogous to DSA 25] 
The recent revival -non-maximal orders
In the meantime however an idea of Pollard lead to todays asymptotically best algorithm for factoring integers -the number eld sieve (see 24] 18 ] which allows to switch from the public non-maximal order to the secret maximal order. Thus during the decryption step, which essentially consists of the computation of ' ?1 , the mask g k simply disappears and the message is recovered. Note that the computation of ' ?1 is essentially one modular inversion with the Extended Euclidean Algorithm which takes quadratic time. It is clear that this cryptosystem is very well suited for applications in which a central server has to decrypt a large number of ciphertext in a short time. For this scenario one may use the recently developed NICEbatch-decryption method 20], which even speeds up the already very e cient decryption process by another 30% for a batch size of 100 messages. There was also proposed an e cient undeniable signature scheme 3] based on the NICE-structure. In 1998 there were also proposed rst conventional signature schemes based non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. In 19] there were proposed RSA-and Rabin analogues. The corresponding encryption schemes have the major advantage that they are immune against low-exponent-and chosen-ciphertext attacks. Moreover there was proposed a novel algorithm to compute square roots in Cl( p ) which replaces the fairly ine cient Gaussian algorithm using ternary quadratic forms. To avoid the computation of h ( 1 ), where j 1 j should have at least 200 bit to prevent the factorization of p using ECM (see 4] for a recent nding of a 53 digit factor), it was proposed to use totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders. Note that the above cryptosystems are based on completely factoring the non-fundamental discriminant p or pq in the case of totally non-maximal orders respectively. While the utilization of totally non-maximal orders for RSA-analogues is only interesting from a theoretical point of view it is clear that this structure may well be used to set up DSA analogues. While the discriminant p = 1 p 2 , with 1 = ?163 and hence h( ) = 1 for example, can be chosen with about 800 bits to obtain the same level of security as for DSA in IF p with p about 1000 bits. Note that this comparison, i.e. 400 bit p for Cl( p ) compared to 1000 bit p for IF p , is a rather pessimistic one. Nevertheless this DSA analogue seemed to be too ine cient to be used in practice. Very recently in 20] however there was proposed an entirely new arithmetic for these totally non-maximal orders. The central idea is to replace the fairly ine cient conventional ideal-arithmetic, i.e. multiplication and reduction of ideals, by simple manipulations on the corresponding generator in the maximal order. This means that instead of (multiple) applications of the comparably costly Extended Euclidean Algorithm one only has a few modular multiplications. This strategy turns out to be thirteen times as fast and ends up with a DSA analogue based on totally non-maximal orders, which running time for the signature generation is roughly comparable to the conventional DSA in IF p . Furthermore there still seems to be much space for further improving this scheme. However beside the possibility to speed up the DSA analogues, there is yet another and even more important e ect of the very recent result 20]:
It was precisely the way how one considers the arithmetic of ideals in totally non-maximal orders there, which lead to the (previously conjectured) constructive version of the reduction proof presented in Section 4 of this work.
Some background and notations concerning imaginary quadratic orders
We rst de ne the function L n e; c] which is used to describe the asymptotic running time of subexponential algorithms. Let n; e; c 2 IR with 0 e 1 and c > 0. Thus we are able to switch to and from the maximal order as applied in the cryptosystems of Section 2.2. The algorithms GoToMaxOrder(a; p) to compute ' ?1 and GoToNonMaxOrder(A; p) to compute ' respectively may be found in 18]. Note, that the above map is de ned on ideals itself, rather than equivalence classes. The class group Cl( p ) of a non-maximal order can be described as follows:
2 Proposition There is an isomorphism This explaination of Cl( p ) is called ring equivalence and will be used in Section 4 to reduce the computation of discrete logarithms in totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders to the computation of discrete logarithms in nite elds. 3 De nition Let 1 < 0 and 1 0; 1 mod 4, such that h( 1 ) = 1 and p prime. Furthermore let g and a be reduced O p -ideals in standard-representation (2), which represent classes of the class group Cl( p ) of the totally non-maximal order. Then the discrete logarithm problem DLP in Cl( p ) is given as follows:
Determine an a 2 ZZ such that g a a, or show that no such a exists. Furthermore the class number of a totally non-maximal order of conductor p is given as follows: 
5 Conclusion
In this work we have shown that the discrete logarithm problem in the class group Cl( p ) of a totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic order can be reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in nite elds using (expected) O(log 3 p) bit-operations. This result clearly implies that the formerly proposed bitlength of 800 for p does not provide su cient security, because one could simply compute discrete logarithms in IF p k , where k 2 f1; 2g which should be possible in the near future if p 2 400 . The algorithm which is used there is the number eld sieve with L 1 3 ]. This would imply that p (at least in the case that ( 1 =p) = 1) should be about 1024 bit to yield (expected) long term security. Hence cryptosystems based on totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic orders seem to loose much of its attractiveness. Analogous to the situation for Elliptic Curves, where the DLP in supersingular curves can e ciently be solved in nite elds with small extension degree, we discovered that there is also a week class for class groups of imaginary quadratic orders. It remains an open question whether it is possible to nd an L 1 3 ] algorithm to compute discrete logarithms in arbitrary class groups. Another open question is whether this result might yield another weak class of elliptic curves, i.e. where the corresponding endomorphism ring is a totally non-maximal imaginary quadratic order. These issues will be subject of further research. To avoid mis-interpretation of this result it should be noted that non-maximal orders like applied in 18, 26] , where the factorization of p is kept secret, are not a ected by this result.
